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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Population aging, accelerating as the Baby Boom generations age, will
have important fiscal consequences because expenditures on social secu-
rity, Medicare, and institutional Medicaid make up more than a third of
the federal budget. However, the projected fiscal pressures are far in the
future, and long-term projections are very unreliable. Our analysis here
has two goals: to examine the fiscal impact of population aging, and to do
this in a probabilistic setting. We find that the old age dependency ratio is
virtually certain to rise by more than 50% through the 2030s, and will
probably continue to increase after 2050, possibly by a great deal. Under
current program structures, population aging would be virtually certain
to increase the costliness of Federal programs as a share of GDP by 35
percent (±2 percent) by the 2030s, and by 60 percent (± 15 percent) in the
second half of the century. We project Federal expenditures (excluding
interest payments and pre-funded programs) to rise from 16 percent of
GDP in 2000 to 30 percent in 2075, almost doubling, while state and local
Research for this paper was funded by a grant from NIA, R37-AC11761. We thank Timothy
Miller for his help with various parts of the analysis, and James Poterba for helpful com-
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expenditures rise only modestly relative to GDP. Almost all of this in-
crease is for programs going primarily to the elderly, which rise from 8
percent of GDP in 1999 to 21 percent of GDP in 2075, due mainly to costs of
health care for the elderly, with pensions a distant second. We expect that
governments wifi respond to these aging-induced cost changes by alter-
ing program structures, so that these conditional projections will not be
realized. Looking at social security, we find that raising the payroll tax rate
by 1.89 percent would have relatively little effect on the probabilities of
early exhaustion, raising the 2.5 percent bound for the exhaustion date
from 2024 to 2036, but raising the median date of exhaustion from 2036 to
2070, and with a 55 percent chance of insolvency within the 75 year
horizon. Looking at Medicare, which now costs 2.2 percent of GDP, we
project a median share in 2075 of 11 percent, five times as great, with a 95
percent probability interval at 5 percent to 26 percent of GDP. Thus there
is a 97.5 percent chance that the ratio wifi at least double, and a 2.5 percent
chance that it wifi increase at least twelve-fold. Although the future is
highly uncertain in many respects, unforeseen demographic or economic
change wifi almost certainly not avert the long-run fiscal crunch. Chang-
ing demographic realities will require some combination of substantial tax
increases or substantial benefit cuts, or other forms of restructuring.
1. INTRODUCTION
Expenditures on social security, Medicare, and Medicaid for nursing-
home care together make up more than a third of the federal budget.1
These are all programs for the elderly, paid for largely out of taxes on the
working-age population. Around 2010, the Baby Boom generations will
begin to turn 65 and to draw on these programs, and by 2040, the ratio of
elderly people to those in the current working ages wifi have doubled
from about 0.2 to about 0.4. Clearly, population aging will exert heavy
pressure on the federal budget in the coming decades. Nonetheless,
there are many questions about this process. The projected fiscal pres-
sures are far in the future, and long-term projections are very unreliable;
might not the whole problem evaporate if we just wait? For example, wifi
increased costs in programs for the elderly be offset by decreased expendi-
tures for children elsewhere in the federal budget and in the state and
local budgets? Wifi the passing of the Baby Boom generations bring fiscal
relief? Wifi high-fertility immigrants raise national fertility, as Census
projects? Or will fertility in the U.S. move towards low European levels,
1Institutional Medicaid is the part of the Medicaid program that pays for nursing-home
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closer to one child per woman, greatly intensifying population aging? In
addition to these demographic sources of uncertainty, there are very
substantial economic uncertainties. These are well illustrated by the rapid-
ity with which projections of fiscal doom in the mid-1990s were replaced
in the late 1990s by projections of burgeoning surpluses, which have
recently been corrected to show declining surpluses over the short run.
To formulate fiscally responsible policies, policymakers must have not
only best-guess forecasts of the future, but also a measure of the uncer-
tainty surrounding these forecasts.
Before proceeding, some background will be helpful. First, it is impor-
tant to put population trends in the U.S. into international perspective.
Among the industrial nations, the U.S. has high fertility and a stingy
public pension system. Combined with middling mortality and immigra-
tion, this adds up to relatively mild population aging and to relatively
modest fiscal pressure, compared to most European nations or Japan.
An OECD study (Roseveare, Leibfritz, Fore, and Wurzel, 1996) found
that the fiscal imbalance in the U.S. public pension system over the next
75 years was among the smallest of any of the OECD countries, relative
to GDP. The fiscal consequences of population aging for the U.S. wifi
indeed be severe, but in many other industrial nations they wifi be
simply staggering.
Second, it is important to distinguish between the fundamental re-
source problem posed by population aging, which would exist whatever
our institutional structures, and the particular problems that arise specifi-
cally because of our institutional arrangements for supporting the el-
derly, including government programs.
Population aging raises the number of elderly people relative to the
number of working-age people, when we hold the age boundary con-
stant at some level such as age 65. In this sense, population aging occurs
partly because individuals live longer, and partly because birth rates are
lower, so that younger generations are smaller at birth than the older
generations. Longer life, by contrast, results at least in part from better
health, so that elderly people at any specific age are more vigorous and
less likely to be disabled. For many years, it was feared that people
whose lives were saved by declining mortality might be functionally
impaired by their close brush with death or by weaker constitutions, so
that disability rates at older ages would rise. In the U.S., at least, this has
not happened, and indeed rates of disability at older ages are declining
at roughly the same rate as mortality itself. Older people wifi increas-
ingly be functionally able to prolong their working lives (Manton,
Corder, and Stallard, 1997; Freedman and Martin, 1999; Crimmins,
Saito, and Ingegneri, 1997). People may choose to take their additional144Lee & Edwards
years of life as leisure years rather than as working years, and conse-
quently they may need to save more or pay higher taxes to support those
additional years of leisure. That is a matter of choice, and not caused by
aging itself. In this sense, longer life does not cause a fundamental
resource problem. By contrast, lower fertility means there are fewer
working-age people in the population relative to the elderly, without
altering the health or functional status of the elderly. Population aging
due to low fertility, unlike that due to low mortality, does fundamentally
alter the resource constraints facing society.
Population aging occurs in the context of a particular set of institutions
and traditions. In the U.S., the median age at retirement, far from rising
with increasing longevity, has declined by five years since 1950. To some
degree, this decline reflects a choice for more leisure at the end of life,
influenced by higher lifetime incomes and the public and private pen-
sions which have made it easier for people to realize what would anyway
have been their preferred life-cycle plans. That is the positive side of the
story. On the negative side, however, both public and private pension
programs have incorporated incentives for earlier retirement, whether by
design or by accident. In Europe, the easy availability of government-
provided disability and unemployment benefits for older people has
added to these incentives, and extended them to younger ages (Gruber
and Wise, 1999). These pension, disability, and unemployment programs
create an implicit tax on continuation of work, inducing many people to
retire early. When population aging occurs in the context of rigid and
distortionary institutions, particularly severe problems may arise. This is
the case for most public pension programs throughout the OECD coun-
tries, and to a lesser extent for the U.S.
Institutional arrangements surrounding the provision of health care,
particularly for the elderly, shape the impact of population aging on
public health care costs. Once again, we must distinguish between
longer life and lower fertility as causes of population aging. Longer life
goes with improved health in old age, and the net effect on health costs
appears to be slight (Lubitz and Prihoba, 1984; Lubitz, Beebe, and Baker,
1995). Nor have the costs of typical medical procedures risen in real
terms, on the contrary, they may have fallen (Cutler, McClellan, New-
house, and Remler, 1998; Cutler and Sheiner, 2000). Why, then, are
government health care expenditures projected to rise so strongly rela-
tive to GDP over the twenty-first century? First, because lower fertility
wifi mean fewer workers to bear the cost of health care for the elderly
(that is, future GDP will be lower than otherwise). Second, because
populations of industrial nations have a great appetite for the costly new
procedures made available by striking technological advances in medi-The Fiscal Effects of Population Aging in the U.S.145
cine over recent decades, advances which are expectedto continue in the
future. In the U.S., these two factorspopulation aging dueto low
fertility and the purchase of costly new biomedical technologiesare
expected to account for roughly equal shares of the projectedincreased
expenditure on health care relative to GDP (Lee and Miller, 2001b).The
portion of the increase due to low fertility and population agingcannot
be avoided, except possibly by pro-natalist and pro-immigrationpoli-
cies. It is important to make sure that the other part, dueto increased
quantity and quality of health care services consumed, isgrowing in a
way consistent with individual and social preferences, not simply be-
cause of distortions arising from the structures of institutions formed
decades ago.
It is easy to exaggerate the fiscalpressures generated by population
aging. In practice, the structure and generosity ofprograms do not re-
main fixed as population changes, and changing populationage distribu-
tions have only modest power to explain government expenditureson
social welfare programs in the past. The structure andgenerosity of
programs may be rigid in the short term, but in the longer term these too
adjust. We should keep in mind, however, thateven if the fiscal pres-
sures are mitigated by program changes, these mitigating changesmay
simply pass costs on to the beneficiaries, in the form of laterretirement
or reduced medical benefits.
This paper will begin by discussing demographic changein the U.S.
Next, it wifi discuss approaches to assessing the uncertainty ofprojec-
tions, which is then followed by an overview ofour own probabilistic
projections of population aging. Then it wifi consider how population
aging alters the budgetary trade-offs that constraingovernment pro-
grams in the aggregate, contingent on the continuation of currentpro-
gram structure. An overview of stochastic budget projection techniques
follows, motivated by a summary of deterministic predictions.The pa-
per will then discuss in more detail the uncertainty of projections for
social security and for Medicare. In the final section,we discuss our
results.
2. POPULATION CHANGE IN THE U.S.
2.1 Fertility
Over the past two centuries in the U.S., the economic roles ofwomen and
children have changed, incomes have risen dramatically, mortality has
declined, the frontier has been settled, and contraceptive technology
has advanced. Consequently, fertility has declined steadily from 7or 8
births per woman in 1800 to 2.0 birthsper woman today, a decline146Lee & Edwards
interrupted by the Baby Boom between 1946 and 1965.Similar factors
have led to a fertility decline in other industrialcountries as well. How-
ever, fertility in the U.S. hasalways been high compared to levels in other
industrial populations. The average level for Europeanpopulations is 1.4
births per woman, with some countries likeSpain, Italy, and Germany
close to 1.2, and a few smaller populations close to1.0. Will fertility in the
U.S. decline toward European levels in the comingdecades? Two consid-
erations reduce the likelihood. First, European womentypically report on
surveys that they would like tohave 2 children on average, suggesting
that fertility may rise in the future. Second, the average ageof childbear-
ing has been rising steadily in most Europeancountries in recent de-
cades, as women postpone giving birth. Thistrend distorts the standard
fertility measure downward by 0.2 to 0.4 births,relative to fertility levels
over the life cycle of these women,again suggesting that European fertil-
ity may rise in the future.
Fertility is high in the U.S. in part due to the higherfertility of minority
groups such as African Americans,Latinos, and Asians. Projections
indicate that the population share of non-HispanicWhites wifi decline
from around 70 percent today to around 50 percentby 2050. Will grow-
ing population shares of these minority groupslead to higher aggregate
fertility? The U.S. Census Bureau has assumed in itsrecent projections
that it will. We are skeptical. It is mainlyfirst-generation immigrants
who have high fertility; by the third generationfertility has historically
converged to the levels of the general population(Smith and Edmons-
ton, 1997). For example, first-generationLatino women have more than
three births on average, whereas third-generationLatino women have
only two. Furthermore, fertility in the sending countriesin Latin Amer-
ica and East Asia is rapidly falling In Mexico,fertility is now down to 2.6
births per woman and falling rapidly, while manypopulations in East
Asia, including China, have fertility belowreplacement level. This sug-
gests that future immigrants will not havefertility that is much higher
than the rest of the U.S. population.
Overall, therefore, we believe it is reasonable toproject, as a point
estimate, that fertility levels continue at thecurrent level of about 2.0,
while noting that there is a great deal of uncertaintyabout this central
forecast.
2.2 Mortalitj
Improvements in nutrition, public sanitationand hygiene, personal hab-
its, biomedical technology, and health servicedelivery have caused mor-
tality declines throughout the world. Dramatic progressfirst against
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has brought life expectancy in most industrial nations from 30 to 40 years
at birth in the early nineteenth century to 75 to 80 years at birth today.
The acceleration of the rate of decline in death rates at the older ages,
even above 100, in recent decades has been particularly striking (Kan-
nisto, Lauritsen, Thatcher, and Vaupel, 1994). Mortality is expected to
continue to decline in the twenty-first century, but how far and how fast
is open to question and controversy. The pessimists believe that it will be
difficult to raise life expectancy above 85 years without truly revolution-
ary medical advances to slow the progress of aging itself (Fries, 1980,
1984; Olshansky, Carnes, and Desesquelles, 2001; Board of Trustees,
2001). Optimists believe that advances in stem-cell and genetic therapies
may raise life expectancy as high as 150 years in this century. Forecasting
methods based on long-run trend extrapolation suggest that life expec-
tancy in the U.S. wifi rise from its current 76.7 years to around 86 years
by 2075, plus or minus 4 years (Lee and Carter, 1992; Lee and Miller,
2001a; Tuljapurkar, Li, and Boe, 2000). Our forecasts in this paper wifi be
based on this latter approach.
2.3 Immigration
The annual number of net immigrants to the U.S. has risen linearly since
1950, and shows no signs of decelerating in recent years. Nonetheless,
because immigration is a policy variable, we have elected to follow the
Social Security Actuaries in assuming that the net annual number will
remain at 900,000. Certainly a case could be made for forecasting the
linear trend to continue.
2.4 Projections by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the Social
Security Administration
While the assumptions about net immigration are very similar between
Census and SSA, the assumptions for fertility and mortality are quite
different. The SSA assumes that fertility will decline from about 2.05
children per woman today to 1.95 by 2025, remaining constant thereafter.
The USBC assumes that fertility will instead increase from its current
level to 2.22 in 2050, then declining slightly to 2.20 in 2075. The difference
of about 0.25 in fertility implies an eventual difference of about 0.5 per-
cent per year in the population growth rate, which is substantial. Further-
more, the SSA assumes a slower increase in life expectancy, to 81.7 in
2050 and 83.0 in 2075, vs. 84.0 and 87.1 for the USBC. Thus by 2075,
Census has life expectancy higher by four years than the Actuaries. These
differences in fertility and assumed mortality decline lead Census to pre-
dict more rapid population growth, and indeed, while the SSA projects
growth at 0.3 percent per year in 2050 and 2075, Census projects 0.7148Lee & Edwards
percent per year in both years, more than twice as rapid. By 2075, the
population projected by Census is 80 million greater than that by the SSA.
Higher fertility eventually makes a population younger, while higher life
expectancy makes it older, so the differences in the projected old age
dependency ratio (OADR) are not as great as otherwise. In 2050, the SSA
OADR is lower, and in 2075, the Census OADR is lower.
2.5 Population Projections
Based on this discussion of fertility, mortality, and immigration, it is
straightforward to carry out the arithmetic of a population projection,
generating forecasts for total population size and age distributions from
which measures such as the OADR could be calculated. Before doing
this, however, we wifi pause to consider how much confidence should
be put in results of this sort.
3. THE UNCERTAINTY OF PROJECTIONS
The public and the government have become well aware of the impend-
ing fiscal pressures that wifi be caused by population aging as the Baby
Boom grows older. Major changes in social security and Medicare, the
programs expected to be most heavily affected, are currently under con-
sideration. Indeed, important changes in social security were already
made in the early 1980s, with the expectation that they would help
restore long-run balance to the system far into the future. Those expecta-
tions now appear to have been too optimistic, for a variety of reasons.
Might our current expectations about population aging and its conse-
quences again turn out to be incorrect? Certainly they will. The projec-
tion horizon for social security is 75 years, but projection only a few
years into the future is fraught with error. The question is not whether
there will be errors, but rather how large and how important the errors
wifi be. For this reason, it is very important that forecasts present not
only the best guess about future outcomes, but also an indication of the
uncertainty surrounding them.
The typical projection results from assumptions about trajectories for
several input variables, such as fertility, mortality, immigration, produc-
tivity growth, inflation, interest rates, and so on. The traditional way of
assessing and conveying the uncertainty of a long-run projection begins
by developing high, medium, and low trajectories for each of the input
variables. It then bundles combinations of these trajectories together to
calculate high, medium, and low projection scenarios. The way the bun-
dling is done depends on the purpose of the projection, and has an
important influence on the results. Consider, for example, populationThe Fiscal Effects of Population Aging in the U.S.149
forecasts. The Social Security Actuaries bundle together high fertility,
high mortality, and high immigration, because all of these conduceto a
lower OADR and to lower projected costs per worker. Census bundles
together high fertility, low mortality, and high immigration, because all
of these conduce to more rapid population growth. The resulting high
low bounds for projected outcomes wifi differ. For example, the Social
Security projections of population size in 2075 range from 344 millionto
486 million, whereas those from Census range from 304 to 809 million.
At the same time, the Social Security projections for the OADR in 2075
range from 0.314 to 0.563, whereas those from Census range from 0.343
to 0.494. For population size, the highlow range of Census is 3.5 times
as great as that of the Social Security projections. For the OADR, the
highlow range for Social Security is 1.6 times as greatas that of Census.
Since they give very different indications of the uncertainty associated
with their forecasts of different items, they cannot both be right.
There are four ways in which the scenario-based approachto assess-
ing uncertainty of forecasts is seriously flawed.2 First, by itsvery nature,
it is forced to make patently false assumptions about the correlation
structure of forecast errors in the input variablesspecifically, that all
the cross-correlations in errors are either +1.0or 1.0. This problem
results from the bundling just described. When Social Security bundles
high fertility with high mortality, it assumes thata large positive forecast
error for fertility always goes with a large positive forecast error for
mortality. Census assumes the opposite. The second problem is similar,
but applies across time rather than across variables. The scenario
method must assume that the input variables will either always follow
the highest plausible trajectory or always follow the lowestone, thereby
ruling out the possibility of long-run fluctuations like the Baby Boom,
which could produce greater variations insome outputs such as the
OADR. Here, it is assumed that the correlation oferrors across time is
always + 1.0. Third, the indications of uncertainty attached by thesce-
nario method to differing outcome variables such as population size,
2Although flawed for assessing uncertainty, scenario-based projectionscan be very useful
for analytic purposes and for sensitivity tests.
In principle, one could calculate the error from each of the past Censusor SSA forecasts
of fertility and mortality, by comparing the forecasts with subsequent realizedoutcomes,
and then these errors could be used to find the actual ex post correlation oferrors in
government agency forecasts of fertility and mortality. Unfortunately, this has not yet been
done. Alternatively, we could fit time-series models to fertility and mortality, and examine
the correlation of the residuals. This results in correlations that are insignificantly different
than 0. However, the time-series models fit short-term movements in the series, whereas
forecast errors arise most dramatically from errors in forecasting long-term levels and
trends.150Lee & Edwcirds
births, fertility, life expectancy, and OADRs are inconsistent. This hap-
pens because each of these outcomeswill reflect differing ways of averag-
ing out the errors in forecasting inputs, with differing degrees ofcancella-
tion of errors, but the method is unable to take this into account, due to
the assumed rigid covariance structure for errors. Fourth, the scenario
method is intrinsically unable to assign probabilities to its high-low
ranges. (See Lee, 1999, and Lee andTuijapurkar, 2000, for an extensive
discussion of the problems with scenario-based forecasting.)
The kinds of inconsistencies that result from scenario-based forecasts
are illustrated in Table 1, which contrastsuncertainty ranges for different
items in forecasts by Census and Social Security, and probabilisticfore-
casts by Lee and Tuljapurkar, to be discussed in a moment.We see that
the range for children in 2050 is larger for Census than for SocialSecu-
rity; for workers, the Census range is twice as wide; for the elderly, it is
three times as wide; but for the OADR it is only one-seventh aswide,
while for the total dependency ratio it is very much wider. For Census,
the working-age population is supposedly known within plus or minus
26 percent, and the elderly population within plus or minus 27 percent,
yet their ratio, the OADR, is supposedly known within 3percent!
Clearly these indications of uncertainty are inconsistent. Similarly, for
Social Security, the total dependency ratio supposedly has only tiny
uncertainty, which is again inconsistent. The probabilistic forecasts
TABLE 1
High-Low Ranges for Forecasts of Selected Items to 2050, as Percentage
of Middle Forecast
(<20 + 65+)/20-64
Calculated as (highlow)/(2Xmiddle). For Census, high minus low; for Social Security Actuaries, high
cost minus low cost; for Lee and Tuljapurkar, upper 95-percent bound minus lower 95-percentbound.
The date of publication of the forecast is indicated; all are for the year 2050, which isthe latest
published by the Census Bureau. For Census, children are <18; for the others, <20. Elderly are always
65+. Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994) did not publish a probability bound for the working-agepopulation, so
none is shown.
R2nge (%)
Soc. Sec. ActuariesLee and Tuljapurkar
Item Census (1992) (1992) (1994)
Children ±44 ±31 ±49
Working age ±26 ± 13 n.a.
Elderly ±27 ±9 ±10
OADR ±3 ±21 ±35
65+ /20-64
Total Dep. Ratio ±10 ±0 ±24The Fiscal Effects of Population Aging in the U.s.151
shown in the last column have fully consistent indications of uncer-
tainty, taking into account all covariances.
Although the traditional and widely used scenario method for assess-
ing uncertainty of forecasts is seriously flawed, there are two other
general approaches that are more useful. The first is analysis of the
performance of past forecasts, and from that analysis, development of
probability distributions for current forecasts on the assumption that the
methods used and other circumstances are sufficiently similar in the past
and future to make this useful. This approach is illustrated by the proba-
bility distributions provided for Congressional Budget Office (CBO) fore-
casts of the federal surplus (CBO, 2001). The CBO had only a short
historical record of forecast performance to analyze, so its probability
distributions were provided for only five years ahead, a serious limita-
tion. Another difficulty is that a separate historical analysis of forecast
errors must be conducted for each variable of interest. For an application
of this approach in demography, see National Research Council (2000,
chapter 7). For an application to the Social Security Actuaries' forecasting
record, see Lee and Tuljapurkar (2000). The second approach is to de-
velop stochastic forecasts that incorporate errors in the forecast of each
input, and reflect their propagation through the forecast process.
Here we will follow a variant of this second approach, in which time-
series methods are used to fit stochastic models for each input variable,
and the propagation of errors is tracked through stochastic simulation.
With this approach, a probability distribution can be calculated for any
outcome of interest, including joint probability distributions for multiple
outcomes. In most cases, we constrain the central trajectory for each
input (that is, the long-run mean) to match an assumption by the Social
Security Actuaries, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (pre-
viously the Health Care Financing Administration), or the Congressional
Budget Office, but this is not the case for mortality. In all cases, the
variances and covariances are estimated from the historical data series.
4. STOCHASTIC POPULATION FORECASTS
The population forecasts we report below are distinctive in two respects.
First, they reflect the choices for central trends in fertility, mortality, and
immigration that we have just discussed, which differ from those in the
projections by Social Security (in having lower mortality) and the Census
Bureau (in having lower fertility). Second, they are probabilistic fore-
casts based on a new method (Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1994).
Figure 1 shows the forecast for the OADR (defined as population 65 +
divided by the population 20 to 64). Focus first on the central Lee-152Lee & Edwards
FIGURE 1. Old-Age Dependency-Ratio Forecasts: 1999 to 2080
Lee-Tuijapurkar: median with probability intervals
SSA: low, middle, and high
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Tuijapurkar forecast, labeled "LT." Over the next decade, there wifi be
a slight decline in the OADR, while the smaller generationsborn when
fertility was low during the 1930s and early 1940s move into old age.
The larger Baby Boom generations begin to reach 65 in 2010, and we see
rapid aging for the next twenty years, slowing or slightly reversing as
the Baby Boomers die off, and the smaller Baby Bust generations born
since the mid 1960s enter old age. Then the OADR resumes its upward
trend. Note that the Baby Boom generations are not the cause of popula-
tion aging; they merely usher it in. It is caused by low fertility and
falling mortality, and unlike the Baby Boom, these are expected to
continue indefinitely.
The figure also plots quantiles of the probability distribution. There
should be a 50-percent chance that the true future value falls between the
25- and 75-percent bounds, and a 95-percent chance that it falls between
the 2.5- and 97.5-percent bounds. Before 2020, all the uncertainty in the
ratio is due to uncertain survival of people through the working ages and
of the elderly who are already born. After 2020, the uncertain births due
to uncertain fertility in 2000 and thereafter begin to enter the working
ages, adding increasing uncertainty to the ratio astime passes. After
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women, compounding the uncertainty in the ratio. Finally, after 2065 the
highly uncertain size of birth cohorts begins to affect the projected num-
bers of elderly in the numerator as well as workers in the denominator.
Note also that there is nearly twice as much uncertainty in the upward
direction as in the downward direction.4 By 2075, there is a 2.5-percent
chance that the increase in the OADR wifi be twice as large as the central
forecast, and a 2.5-percent chance that it wifi be only one-fourth as large
as forecast. In any case, however, it is virtually certain that substantial
population aging wifi occur over the next forty years.
For comparison, Figure 1 also plots the central projections by Social
Security (SSA) and Census (USBC), along with their non-probabilistic
high and low projection variants. We note that there are not major
differences in the central forecasts, but that after 2040, the Census and
Social Security projection ranges have much less than 95-percent proba-
bility coverage. The upward range for both Census and Social Security is
close to the LeeTuljapurkar 75-percent bound, meaning that the true
value would be expected to exceed the high bound for these projections
about 25 percent of the time, if the LeeTuijapurkar probability distribu-
tion is correct.
5. HOW POPULATION AGING AFFECTS
GOVERNMENT BUDGETS
It is straightforward and natural to use population projections to project
the future costs of benefits, on the assumption that program structures
will remain as they are now. Such projections are useful for tracing out
the implications of current policies, and thereby informing decisions
about changing those policies. These exercises should be viewed only as
conditional forecasts, however. Studies of the effect of population aging
in the past on government budgets show much smaller effects, because
in practice programs are adjusted. For example, Gruber and Wise (2001)
examined data for OECD countries over time, and found that a 10-
percent increase in the proportion of elderly in the population led to a 5-
percent increase in expenditures on the elderly, so that expenditures per
individual old person declined while the aggregate expenditure on the
elderly increased (that is, they found an expenditure elasticity of 0.5,
measured relative to GDP). They also found that spending in other areas
of the budget was reduced, so that total government expenditures as a
share of GDP did not change with population aging.
This is typical of the probability distributions for population forecasts. Population growth
is multiplicative, so uncertainty is lognormally distributed.154Lee & Edwards















Evidently population change does not dictate outcomes, but rather
alters the trade-offs and constraints faced by policymakers. In the rest of
this section, we will consider how this works. We begin by presenting the
current cost of benefits received by age in the U.S., 13(x), and tax pay-
ments by age, T(x). Figure 2 plots 13(x), broken down by broad categoryof
expenditure, but originally based on 25 individual or household benefit
programs (school lunches, TANF, energy assistance, SSI) plusadditional
non-individual programs (roads, police, etc.) (see the Appendix for expla-
nation of how these were estimated). The data refer to average amounts
per surviving individual at each age, so keep inmind that there are
relatively few survivors to very old ages. They include all government
expenditures at the federal, state, and local levels, except for expendi-
tures on public goods (mostly defense spending). Expenditureswhich do
not accrue to individuals or households are assigned on a per capitabasis.
The concentration of expenditures on children and on the elderly is appar-
ent. The average elderly person receives over $20,000, which is aboutfour
times as much as the average child. Note that Medicaid expenditures for
elderly people are primarily for nursing-home care.
Figure 3 plots 7(x), again per surviving individual at each age, and
broken down by kind of tax (see the Appendix for details of construc-
60 80FIGURE 3. Taxes by Program and Age
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tion). Note that for some kinds of taxes, the elderly pay about the same
amount as prime-age adultsnotably corporate tax (inferred from divi-
dend income), property tax, and sales tax. However, because they
don't have much labor income, they pay far less payroll tax and income
tax, and in total pay much lower taxes than prime-age adults.
To see how population aging will affect the costliness of our current
agebenefit structure, we can calculate how the changing population
age distribution would alter the ratio of total taxes to total benefit expen-
ditures. We will call this ratio the fiscal support ratio. We could imagine an
individual or a planner weighing the utility of receiving the benefit sched-
ule 13(x) over the life cycle, vs. receiving the after-tax income that would
be released by reducing or eliminating the programs that 13(x) comprises.
While individual utility from the stream of benefits is distributed over
future years of the life cycle, the cost in taxes is determined by the cross-
sectional balanced-budget constraint in each year, which is in turn deter-
mined by the population age distribution. This interplay between the
individual life cycle and the cross-sectional population age distribution
generates the fiscal effects of population aging. In an important sense,
the population age distribution determines the price of the vector of life-
cycle benefits, 13(x). This price is the ratio of aggregate taxes to benefits,156Lee & Edwards
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Note: The fiscal support ratio is calculated as the ratio of tax revenues to government expenditures,
based on the age-specific tax and expenditure profiles for 2000, applied to the projected age distribution
for each period.
evaluated for the changing population age distributions in the future,
using the current age profiles of taxes and benefits, 13(x) and 7(x). A
similar calculation could be made using the projected profiles of taxes
and benefits for some later year, and that would give somewhat different
results.
Figure 4 plots the changing ratio of taxes to benefits over the next cen-
tury, based on the central population forecast. It can be seen that there is
hardly any effect at the state and local level; the ratio is quite constant
over the century. At the federal level, however, population aging leads
to a far bigger increase in benefit costs than in tax revenues. The same
level of taxes represented by 7(x) would buy a level of benefits, 13(x), only
64 percent as high in 2075 as in 2000. Put differently, we might say that
population aging wifi raise the price of this benefit bundle 13(x) by 56The Fiscal Effects of Population Aging in the U.S.157
percent (0.64 = 1/1.56) over this century, in terms of after-tax income.5
As population aging alters this price, we might expect voters and policy
makers to choose a lower level of the benefit age profile(x), and corre-
spondingly more after-tax income for taxpayers.6 The net effect on aggre-
gate benefit expenditures would be ambiguous. Although there will be a
greater number of elderly people, each of them would receive lower
benefits, and consequently the net effect of population aging on both
aggregate benefit expenditures and on aggregate taxes and tax rates
would be ambiguous. This interpretation, although ignoring the costs of
transitions between program regimes, is broadly consistent with Gruber
and Wise's (2001) results described above.
Note also that Figure 4 is based on the current program structure, and
so it does not reflect the large expenditure increases per beneficiary that
are projected for Medicare and Medicaid over the course of the twenty-
first century, due to projected increases in the quality and quantity of
services consumed (Lee and Miller, 2001b).
Figure 4 showed a single forecast of the support ratio, as if we actually
knew what the future would bring. Figure 5 presents probabilistic fore-
casts of the support ratio, showing the median value (which was plotted
in Figure 4) along with 95-percent probability intervals. In early years,
uncertainty results largely from uncertainty about fertility; the effects of
uncertain mortality emerge only over the longer run. Variations in fertil-
ity have a strong effect on state and local finance once they affect the
number of children of school age, that is, at age 5 or older. Thus the
probability band for the state and local support ratio is very narrow for
the first five years of the forecast, and opens up rapidly thereafter. The
number of children has relatively little effect on the federal budget until
they grow old enough to enter the work force and begin paying taxes,
beginning around age 20. Even then, the steep slope of 7(x) implies that
uncertain fertility does not have a large effect on taxes for a number of
years after that. Thus, the probability interval for the federal support
ratio is very narrow for the first thirty years or so, and then widens as
uncertainty about the size of the labor force grows. Uncertain mortality
Strictly speaking, this interpretation makes sense only when all difference in population
age distributions is due to change in fertility, not mortality, and the system is unchanging
over time. When mortality is declining, then the expected value of the benefit package over
the life cycle wifi rise, since the expected duration of receiving benefits in old age increases.
When the program system is changing over time, then the link between individual benefits
over the life cycle and the current benefit package is not tight.
In reality, the shape of /3(x) could also be changed, for example by favoring programs for
children at the expense of programs for the elderly. Population aging also alters the cost of
providing benefits to a child relative to the cost of providing benefits to an elderly person.158Lee & Edwards
FIGURE 5. Projected Fiscal Support Ratio by Level of Government,
2000 to 2100 (Median and 95% Probability Interval)
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Note: The Fiscal Support Ratio is calculated as the ratio of tax revenues to
government expenditures, based on the age specitic tax and expenditure profiles
for 2000, applied to the projected age distribution for each period. Stochastic
population projections were bused on the methods in Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1994.
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Note: The fiscal support ratio is calculated as the ratio of tax revenues to government expenditures,
based on the age-specific tax and expenditure profiles for 2000, applied to the projected age distribution
for each period. Stochastic population projections were based on the methods in Lee and Tuijapurkar
(1994).
contributes a small amount of uncertainty to the support ratio, but not
much.
It is clear that demographic change is almost certain to cause serious
pressures on the federal budget as the Baby Boom generations enter old
age. Through 2040 or so, budgetary pressures can be projected with
great confidence. After this it is not so clear whether pressures wifi
continue to mount, or somewhat abate.
At the state and local level, the median support ratio shows no trend,
but there is a great deal of uncertainty. It is not clear that there would be
any advantage to planning for a growing school-age population, when
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In the long run, there is a negative correlation between errors in fore-
casting the state and local fiscal support ratio and the federal one. High
fertility is costly for the state and local entities providing public educa-
tion, but it allows lower taxes at the federal level, since it generates more
workers to support the elderly. Thus, there is less uncertainty in the
total fiscal support ratio than one would expect from looking at its con-
stituent parts.
6. CONSTRUCTING STOCHASTIC BUDGETARY
FORECASTS
We can build on these stochastic population forecasts to develop
stochastic projections of government expenditures, assuming that the
basic structure of programs is unchanged. To do so we need first to
develop the linkage of population forecasts to costs of benefits, and
second to incorporate some sources of economic uncertainty.7 Popula-
tion is linked to benefit costs by the age schedule of costs of benefits
currently received by a person in age group x. This average benefit
profile is the 13(x) presented earlier in Figure 2. This schedule cannot be
expected to remain fixed in the future, however, even under the assump-
tion that program structure remains fixed. Benefits for most programs
can be expected to rise as productivity increases. We will follow CBO in
assuming that most benefits rise in real cost at the same rate as productiv-
ity growth, which raises per capita incomes and labor costs. Some pro-
grams, notably social security, Medicare, and Medicaid, require special
treatment, however, as we now discuss.
For social security, we take into account the legislated change in the
normal retirement age from 65 to 67 in the coming decades. Our projec-
tions of benefits are based on the actual rules governing benefits in
relation to prior earnings (see Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1998a and 1998b, for
details), and indirectly take into account such particulars as the notch
generation, the selective effect of mortality at older ages, and the effects
of loss of spouse on benefit levels.
Benefit costs for Medicare have typically been rising much more rapidly
than productivity growth, and are expected to do so for the foreseeable
future. We constrain our median projection for health care costs per en-
rollee at each age to follow the CBO (2000) assumptions (which are very
similar to the 2001 HCFA/CMMS projection assumptions in Board of Trust-
ees of the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, 2001) in which the rate
For a number of years, CEO published stochastic long-term forecasts based on these Lee-
Tuljapurkar stochastic population forecasts, with deterministic economic variables.160Lee & Edwards
of increase per enrollee declines to an eventual level 1 percent per year
more rapid than the growth rate of productivity. We differ, however, in
taking into account the distribution of the population at each age by time
until death. The Medicare costs of individuals have been shown to be
closely associated with their proximity to death (Lubitz and Prihoba, 1984;
Lubitz, Beebe, and Baker, 1995; Miller, 2001). In a projection, we know for
each year what proportion of people at a given age will die within one
year, one to two years, ten years, and so on, and can allocate health costs
accordingly. Time until death thus serves as a kind of index of health
status. We apply the rate of increase of per enrollee cost to each category
of time until death separately (see Lee and Miller, 2001b, for details).
For Medicaid, we note that the proportion of the elderly population in
long-term care facilities at each age has been declining for some time,
presumably due to the improving health of the elderly population. We
project this decline to continue, which partially offsets the increasing
costs of care for those in institutions.
7. DETERMINISTIC FORECASTS OF THE FISCAL
EFFECTS OF AGING
We will begin by considering some deterministic projections, then turn
to stochastic ones.
Figure 6 plots projected government expenditures as shares of GDP for
the federal government, and for state and local governments grouped to-
gether, as well as their sum. Excluded from these totals are interest pay-
ments on the federal debt, and benefits paid for pre-funded programs
such as most state and local pensions and some insurance funds. Total
expenditures are initially 25 percent of GDP, but are projected to rise
above 40 percent of CDP by 2075 and to continue climbing thereafter. For
the federal budget and overall, there is an acceleration in the rate of
increase between 2010 and 2030 when the Baby Boom is reaching old age,
but clearly that is only a part of the story, since the trend continues rapidly
upward after 2040. At the state and local level, expenditures rise only
mildly relative to GDP. Almost all the increase in the total is due to
increases at the federal level, which is not surprising given the importance
of federal transfers to the elderly. Federal expenses increase from 16 per-
cent of GDP in 2000 to 30 percent iii 2075, almost a doubling, and by 2100
they are approaching 40 percent.
It is also interesting to separate these expenditures by age group of the
recipients. We define three categories: spending on the elderly, spend-
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each program to one of these three categories, based eitheron the nature
of the program or on some criterion such as the average dollar-weighted
age of the recipient.
Figure 7 shows the result for all levels of government combined. Ex-
penditures for children are flat over the next 100 years, relative to GDP.
Age-neutral expenditures show some growth, but only to the extent that
they include the non-institutional component of Medicaid, whichgrows
faster than GDP due to excess growth in per capita healthcare costs.
Almost all the projected increase in government spending over the next
75 years and beyond is due to increased expenditures on programs for
the elderly. These rise from about 8 percent of GDP in 1999 to 21 percent
of GDP in 2075, and they more than triple their share by 2100.
It is also illuminating to look at the growth in expenditures by kind of
program, rather than by age of recipient. Figure 8 shows the growth in
projected expenditures for retirement programs (OASDI, federal employ-
ees, and railroad workers), health programs for the elderly (Medicare
Parts A and B and institutional Medicaid), other expenditures for the
2040 2020 2030162Lee & Edwards
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elderly, and all other federal expenditures. It is striking that the growth
in expenditures for retirement programs, including social security, is
such a small part of the projected growth in federal spending, contrary
to the attention allocated to retirement programs inpublic discussions.
Retirement accounts for only one-eighth of the total growth, with most
of the rest due to growth in health care for the elderly. This very low
share is in part due to the assumption of a 2.3-percent mean rate of
productivity growth, which is 1.0 percent higher than the Social Security
Actuaries' assumption, and which in itself would improve the summary
actuarial balance measure from 1.89 percent of the present value of
payroll to only 0.89 percent, making more than half of the projected
imbalance disappear. Without this assumption, retirement programs
would account for about a quarter of the projected expenditure increase.
The projected increases in health care for the elderly are roughly half
due to population aging (reflecting low fertility rather than mortality
decline) and half to increases in costs per enrollee in excess of productiv-
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FIGURE 8. Federal Expenditures per GDP by Type of Spending
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HCFA/CMIvIS on this excess rate of cost growth have a powerful influ-
ence on these projections.
8. STOCHASTIC BUDGETARY PROJECTIONS
So far we have not discussed how economic uncertainty is incorporated
in our projections. We treat productivity growth and (where relevant)
real interest rates and stock market returns as stochastic, followinga
modeling strategy similar to that used for fertility in the demographic
projections (see the Appendix for details). That is, we model these as
stochastic time series, and fit the models on historical data. The models
we fit are constrained to have mean values that are consistent either with
comparable official projections or the historical record, dependingon the
purpose of the forecast. Matching social security, our real interest rate
averages 3 percent per year; we set labor productivity growth at 2.3
















returns are 7 percent per year, reflecting historical trends in the S&P 500.
Thus for the most part, our fitted models are providing the structure of
errors for our forecasts of economic inputs, but nottheir mean or median
values, which are rather imposed. For the productivity growth rate, the
standard error of the one-step forecast is 1.78 percent, so a 95-percent
probability interval has a width of 7 percent, wide indeed. For the
interest-rate model, the one-step forecast has a standard error of 2.04
percent, so the width of a 95-percent interval is over 8 percent. These
intervals are very much wider than the highlow assumption ranges of
Social Security, which have a width of 1 percent for productivity growth
and 1.5 percent for real interest rates. However, it must be borne in mind
that the stochastic interval refers to realized values in a single year,
whereas the Actuaries' assumptions can best be thought of as referring
to a long-run average.
The actual stochastic forecast is then carried out through stochastic
simulation. A single stochastic trajectory is calculated by drawing ran-
dom numbers to determine the forecast errors for the first year, which
are then inserted in the appropriate equation foreach input, along with
the previous years' values, leading to a one-step forecast. Then the
forecasts of population and benefit costs are derived mechanically from
these forecasts of inputs. Then a second round of random numbers is
drawn to generate the second year of the forecast, and so on. In this
way one stochastic trajectory is forecast. We generate manysuch trajec-
tories, generally at least a thousand, and then use the frequency distri-
bution for outcomes of interest to estimate the probability distribution of
the forecast. Outcomes include total expenditures on benefits, expendi-
tures for a particular program, the date of Trust Fund exhaustionfor
social security, or the Trust Fund ratio, and so on. If desired, we can
also project tax revenues in a similar way, and we can constrain tax rates
to be adjusted so as to maintain some target such as a pre-specified
debt-to-GDP ratio.
9. STOCHASTIC PROJECTIONS FOR
SOCIAL SECURITY
We now turn to stochastic long-term projections of the finances of the
social security system, drawing on Lee and Tuljapurkar (1998a, 1998b).
We have already described the methods we have used, so we can move
directly to results. Perhaps the most basic statistic is the cost rate, that is,
the costs of benefits in a given year as a percentage of payroll in that
year. In a pure pay-as-you-go system, with no accumulated trustfund,35
20
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FIGURE 9. Cost Rate (Outgo as a Percentage of Taxable Payroll)
this would be the payroll tax rate for each year. Figure 9 plots various
probability quantiles and the mean of the cost rate for eachyear through
2075, with a projection base year of 2000. These runs are basedon the
productivity growth-rate assumption of Social Security, so aside from
our forecast of more rapid mortality improvement, our central forecasts
should match closely those of the Social Security Actuaries for thesame
base year (Board of Trustees, 2000). The results reported herewere
generated by a stochastic simulation program written by Michael Ander-
son and Shripad Tuljapurkar,8 which can be accessed free via the In-
ternet at http: / /simsoc.demog.berkeley.edu.
Users can modify many aspects of the policy environment, including
plans for investing a portion of the Trust Fund in equities, raising the
age at retirement, and raising the payroll tax rate.
8The results presented in Figures 9-12 are based on the output of this program, which is
currently in beta testing and not guaranteed to be bug-free.
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We see that by 2075, the median cost rate is 21.2 percent. There is a 2.5-
percent probability that the cost rate wifi be only 14.6 percent,but also a
2.5-percent probability that it wifibe at least as high as 36.5 percent.These
figures can be compared with the Social Security projections (Board of
Trustees, 2000), which give 19.5 percent for the intermediate trajectory
and 13.9 to 28.3 percent for the range. Our central forecast is about 2
percent higher, due to the more rapid decline in mortality that weproject.
Our lower 2.5-percent bound is similar to the SSA low cost scenario,but
our high 2.5-percent bound is almost7 percent higherconsistent with
Figure 1, which showed much larger uncertainty in the upwarddirection
for the OADR than indicated by either Social Security or Census.By
construction (see the Appendix) the long-run means of our forecasts for
fertility, for the productivity growth rate, and for the real interest rate are
identical to those assumed by the Social Security Actuaries, while our
projected life expectancy for 2075 is about three years higher.
We have compared our outcomes with those of the Actuaries,but it is
important to note that ours are probabilistic whereas theirs are determin-
istic ranges and have no probabilistic meaning. It appears that the Actu-
aries' low cost scenario matches our lower 2.5-percent bound for the cost
rate, while their high cost scenario corresponds roughly to our upper86-
percent bound. That is, the chances that the cost rate wifiexceed the
Actuaries' high cost boundary are more than five times greater than the
chances of its failing to reach the low cost boundary.
There is relatively little uncertainty in the income rate, that is, tax in-
come as a proportion of payroll, sincethe only uncertainty comes from
revenues from taxes on benefits. However,the highly uncertain cost rate
leads to large uncertainty in the various measures of net outcome. For
example, our forecasts find a median date of fund exhaustion under
current policy of 2038, very close to the intermediate projectionof the
Actuaries, 2037. We find a 2.5-percent chance of exhaustion by 2024,
versus 2027 for the high cost projection of theActuaries. We also find
roughly a 4-percent probability of exhaustion after 2075, compared to no
exhaustion by 2075 for the Actuaries' low cost projection, which also has
a healthy Trust Fund ratio at that point.
The Actuaries finds that an immediate rise in the payroll tax of 1.89
percentage points should restore actuarial balance over the 75-yearhori-
zon. We have also simulated the outcome assumingtaxes are raised in
this manner, from the current rate of 12.4 percent to 13.29 percent.
Figure 10 depicts a histogram of the 1,000 probabilistic dates of exhaus-
tion generated by our model under such a policy. Ourmethod makes
explicit what may be fairly intuitive: An immediate rise in payroll taxes
designed to restore actuarial balance wifi only prevent Trust Fund bank-FIGURE 10. Histogram of 1,000 Dates of Exhaustion with Immediate
Payroll Tax Increase of 1.89%
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ruptcy roughly 50 percent of the time. More strikingly, the lognormal
dispersion of exhaustion dates in Figure 10 implies that the mode of the
distribution actually occurs much earlier than 2075. Even a painfully
large hike in the payroll tax today does not move the most frequently
realized future date of bankruptcy past about 2055.
Figure 11 displays a histogram showing 1,000 realizations of the 75-
year actuarial balance dating from 2000, under the prescribed 1.89-
percentage-point rise in the payroll tax. The long left tail indicates that
the chances of undershooting actuarial balance, denoted by 0on the
horizontal axis of the graph, are more widely dispersed than the chances
of overshooting. That is, although the risks are roughly balanced under
an immediate payroll tax hike, the downside risks are more costly.
Our stochastic framework lends itself particularly well to analyses involv-
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policymakers considered plans to invest part or all of the Trust Fund in
equities, and currently the Bush administration is said to be weighing
the option to replace part of the system with private accounts. An assess-
ment of the riskiness of such plans is important in light of the uncer-
tainty of stock market returns. Figure 12 presents a histogram of Trust
Fund exhaustion dates under a particular investment plan: immediately
placing 20 percent of the entire Fund balance in the S&P 500 in 2000, and
increasing that share to 50 percent by 2010. The most striking characteris-
tic of Figure 12 is that the distribution peaks soon around 2030-2035and
then tapers off very rapidly, even though the median date of Fund
exhaustion is 2044. This dynamic is due to the risky nature of stock
returns, which may potentially help social security's financesconsider-
ably, but at the same time wifi not change the expected date of bank-
ruptcy very much. We have also simulated the effects of investing75
percent of the Trust Fund in equities immediately. This leads to a mean
fund balance equal to three times GDP in 2074. However, the medianFIGURE 12. Histogram of 1,000 Dates of Exhaustion: Investing 20%
in 2000, Rising to 50% by 2010
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fund balance is minus half of GDP, and there is still a 63-percent chance
of insolvency within 75 years. The mean outcome is a misleading mea-
sure because it is strongly affected by the long upward tail of the distribu-
tion of favorable stock market outcomes.
10. STOCHASTIC PROJECTIONS OF
MEDICARE COSTS
Detailed projections of Medicare costs as a share of projected GDP are
developed in Lee and Miller (2001b). We wifi not describe the methods
or results in detail here, but rather wifi summarize some of the main
points. Using the methods described earlier, the LeeMiller median pro-
jection is that Medicare expenditures wifi rise from 2.2 percent of GDP
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Figure 13, where the middle line represents the median trajectory of
Medicare's share of output. The LeeMiller forecast stays close to the
CBO forecast until it terminates in 2040. More rapid mortality declines
projected by Lee and Miller have offsetting effects on projected health
costs, since, as discussed above, lengthening life spans generally coin-
cide with lengthening healthy life spans.
The projected increase in Medicare costs is huge, more than twice as
big, as a share of GDP, as are total expenditures on social security today.
Not surprisingly, however, the projected increase is highly uncertain.
Before turning to the probability distribution for the forecast, however,
we should consider the potential sources of error. First, there isdemo-
graphic uncertainty. However, note that uncertainty arising through
mortality is largely canceled by the parallel uncertainty in the health
status of the population: If people live longer, it wifi be because they areThe Fiscal Effects of Population Aging in the U.S.171
in better health, or so the time-until-death approach assumes. Second,
note that uncertainty about the rate of productivity increase is also fil-
tered out, once we express the costs relative to GDP. If productivity
growth is 1 percent per year more rapid than expected, then by assump-
tion health costs will also grow 1 percent per year more rapidly than
expected, as will GDP. The ratio of total costs to GDP is unaffected.
Therefore the most important sources of uncertainty in the ratio of costs
to GDP will be fertility and the size of the gap between the rates of
increase in per-enrollee costs and productivity growth. We have fitted a
time-series model to this gap over the past 50 years and then used it to
assess the variance structure of the gap.9
With this background, we found that the 95-percent probability inter-
val for the cost-to-GDP ratio in 2075 is 5 to 26 percent, as shown in Figure
13. That is, there is a 97.5-percent chance that the ratio will at least
double, and a 2.5-percent chance that it wifi increase at least twelvefold.
The uncertainty in the upward direction is more than twice as great as in
the downward direction, similar to results we have seen before. This
range of uncertainty reflects the U.S. experience with cost containment
in the 1990s as well as earlier periods of more rapid growth. It is indeed
difficult to plan for the future when there is so much uncertainty.
Comparing our 95-percent intervals with the CBO projections, we
find that while in later years of their forecasts their highlow range is
similar to our 95-percent range, for earlier years their range greatly
understates the uncertainty. This is a common problem with the sce-
nario approach for assessing uncertainty in projections.
11. DISCUSSION
Population aging is virtually certain to occur in the coming decades, and
it wifi have a serious impact on the costliness of many government
programs. We have assessed the fiscal pressures of population aging by
examining its impact on many age-assignable government programs, as
well as on tax receipts. However, recent economic change has under-
lined the dangers of ignoring the role of chance in formulating our plans.
Many projections simply assume that the short-run or long-run future
wifi unfold according to the pattern of the past few years, which is a
risky practice. Good forecasts ought to provide some measure of this
risk. Yet the scenario method, which is most widely used to incorporate
We have followed the suggestion of the Technical Advisory Panel for HCFA/CMMS in
using a more general measure of health costs to calculate this gap, rather than specifically
Medicare costs, and therefore we are able to go back in time before Medicare was launched
in 1965.172Lee & Edwards
uncertainty in government forecasts, is seriously flawed. We, together
with collaborators, have developed new and explicitly probabilistic meth-
ods for forecasting population and government expenditures, based on
analysis of historical variability combined in many cases with expert
judgement about central trends. Thus our analysis has had two goals: to
examine the fiscal effects of population aging, and to do this in a probabi-
listic setting using stochastic simulation.
Beginning with the demography, we find that the OADR is virtually
certain to increase by more than 50 percent in the 2030s. While it is
possible that it wifi decline a bit thereafter as the Baby Boom generations
die, more likely it will continue to increase after 2050, possibly by a great
deal. The chance of very high ratios is substantially greater than indi-
cated by Census or Social Security projections. Population aging raises
the cost of the current structure of government programs (including
those for children) relative to tax revenues, and makes a given package
of life-cycle benefits more costly relative to the life-cycle tax payments
necessary to fund it. We find that population aging is virtually certain to
increase the costliness of current federal programs by 35 percent (±2
percent) by the 2030s, and with less certainty by 60 percent (± 15 percent)
in the second half of the century. Although population aging will not
affect the costliness of average state and local programs in the mean or
median forecast, there is considerable uncertainty about this (±20 per-
cent or so) after 2020. We expect that governments wifi respond to these
aging-induced cost changes by altering program structures, as they have
in the past.
Although it is unlikely that the current program structure wifi remain
unchanged, it is nonetheless useful to project the consequences of main-
taining it. Under this assumption (while the retirement age rises as cur-
rently legislated and health care costs per enrollee rise as projected),
federal expenditures are projected to rise dramatically relative to GDP,
from 16 percent of GDP in 2000 to 30 percent in 2075, almost a doubling,
and by 2100 they are approaching 40 percent (these figures exclude
interest payments on the debt and payments into pre-funded pro-
grams). State and local expenditures rise only modestly relative to GDP.
Almost all of this increase is for programs going primarily to the elderly,
which rise from 8 percent of GDP in 1999 to 21 percent of GDP in 2075
and which more than triple their share by 2100. Programs for health care
for the elderly account for the greatest part of this increase, with pen-
sions a distant second.
Looking specifically at the social security system, although we believe
the Actuaries underproject future mortality improvements, we are im-The Fiscal Effects of Population Aging in the U.S.173
pressed by the quality of their projections. However, we find that they
underestimate the risk of very costly outcomes. According to our proba-
bilistic projections, the chances that the cost rate will exceed the Actu-
ary's high cost boundary are more than five times greater than the
chances of its failing to reach the low cost boundary. Raising the payroll
tax rate by 1.89 percent, which according to the Trustees Report of 2000
would have put the system into 75-year actuarial balance, has relatively
little effect on the probabilities of early exhaustion, raising the 2.5-
percent bound of exhaustion from 2024 to 2036, while raising the median
date of exhaustion from 2036 to 2070; there would still be a 55-percent
chance of insolvency within the 75-year horizon, with a median Trust
Fund balance after 75 years of 6 percent of GDP. Investing some or all
of the Trust Fund in equities may help solve the long-run problem in
terms of average outcomes, but not in terms of more important mea-
sures such as the median outcome or the probability of insolvency.
Looking specifically at Medicare, which now costs 2.2 percent of GDP,
we found a median share in 2075 of 11 percent, five times as great. The
95-percent probability interval for 2075 is 5 to 26 percent of GDP, so that
there is a 97.5-percent chance that the ratio wifi at least double, and a
2.5-percent chance that it wifi increase at least twelvefold. The uncer-
tainty in the upward direction is more than twice as great as in the
downward direction, reflecting lognormality, as we have seen before.
Because probabilistic forecasts have only recently become available,
research on their uses and implications has barely begun. The immedi-
ate impulse is to treat these forecasts as if they simply provided an
improved highlow range. In fact, they contain much more information
than that, and they can support more powerful uses and analyses.
One key question is how uncertainty should affect our planning.
Should the possibility of worse outcomes lead us to take additional pre-
cautionary measures today, or should the possibility of better outcomes
lead us to postpone action until we are sure action wifi be necessary?
(See, for example, Auerbach and Hassett, 2001). Another important
question is how different kinds of policies perform in the context of
uncertainty. Do some reduce the uncertainty and others amplify it? For
example, indexing retirement benefits to life expectancy at retirement
(as has been done in Sweden) wifi reduce uncertainty for the pension
system arising from future mortality, by passing on the consequences of
the uncertainty from the taxpayers to the beneficiaries. Medicare costs
turn out to be only slightly affected by uncertainty in future mortality,
because of offsetting effects of health improvement on numbers of en-
rollees and costs per enrollee. Using the stochastic simulations as a kind174Lee & Edwards
of experimental laboratory, various policies can be assessed in terms of
criteria such as intergenerational equity, rapidity of changes in taxes,
rates of return, and so on.
APPENDIX: METHODS USED FOR STOCHASTIC
PROJECTIONS
A.1 Demographic Projections
A.li MortalityLet m(x,t) be a central death rate for age [x,x+5) and
time [t,t+1). Suppose we have a matrix of X age-specific death rates over
T years. The LeeCarter method estimates the model:
In= a + b1k+ 8x,t (A.1)
using a singular-value decomposition (SVD) or some other appropriate
method. This yields estimates of a, b, and k. A second-stage procedure
adjusts k to match exactly the life expectancy at birth implied by the
for each year t.
We now have a time series of k over T years (for most purposes, we
have used data from 1950 to 1999; for some purposes, we start in 1900).
This time series is modeled using standard BoxJenkins methods. (Tests
for covariance with the residuals from the fertility model described be-
low showed no association, so they were modeled independently). In
most applications, it is well fitted by a random walk with drift. The fitted
model for k can then be used to forecast k over the desired horizon,
together with a probability distribution for each forecast year:
= k1 1.029 +,s.e.e. = 1.366. (A.2)
(0.195)
From the forecasts of k, using equation (A. 1), probability distributions and
mean or median values of1nand the implied life expectancies can be
calculated, along with probability distributions. These probability distri-
butions wifi typically reflect the innovation errorin k, along with the
uncertainty of the estimate of the drift in the k process. They typically will
not include the 8xt terms, nor the uncertainty in the estimates of the a and
b, which do not add much to the uncertainty after the first decade or two.
On all of this, see Lee and Carter (1992) and Lee and Miller (2001a).
A.1.2 Fertility A similar approach is followed, but the fertility rates
themselves, rather than their logs, are modeled. The model for age-
specific fertility g isThe Fiscal Effects of Population Aging in the U.s.175
g=c+df,+ (A.3)
which is again estimated using a SVD. Time-series models applied to the
history of fertility in the U.S. do not provide a plausible model or fore-
cast for fertility, for various reasons, so the mean of the forecast is con-
strained to equal a level specified ex ante, and in practice is taken to equal
the ultimate level of fertility assumed by the Social Security Actuaries,
currently 1.95 children per woman. The fitted time-series model then
provides crucial information about the variability and autocovariance of
fertility. See Lee (1993) for a discussion of all these issues, and explora-
tion of some alternative modeling strategies. The fitted fertility time-
series model is
=0.96f - 0.0037 + +0.52v, (A.4)
where the standard deviation of v is 0.11.
A.1.3 ImmigrationImmigration was projected deterministically follow-
ing the assumption of the Social Security Actuaries, since it was thought
better to treat it as a policy instrument than to attempt to forecast future
policy.
A.t4 Population ForecastsInitial conditions for the forecast come
from the base-period population age distribution, taken from social secu-
rity data. A single stochastic sample path is generated by drawing ran-
dom numbers for the errors in the fertility and mortality equations, and
thereby generating a trajectory of age-specific fertility and mortality rates
over the desired horizon, say 100 years. Sample paths containing a total
fertility rate below 0 or greater than 4 are discarded. In remaining paths,
any negative age-specific birth rates are set to 0. These are combined
with the deterministic immigration rates. Using well-known accounting
identities, the population forecast by age group is then calculated for this
single sample path. The procedure is then repeated many times, some-
times 1,000 times and sometimes 10,000 times. The frequency distribu-
tions of outcomes of interest then provide estimates of the probability
distributions for these outcomes, and joint distributions can be provided
in a similar way.
A.2 Economic Projections
A.2.1 Productivit, A demographically adjusted productivity growth
series was constructed. First, an average wage profile by age and sex was
calculated from the 1997 March Current Population Survey (CPS). Data176Lee & Edwards
on the agesex composition of the labor force were also taken fromthe
CPS, from 1948 to the present. The effect of the changing agesex compo-
sition of the labor force, based on these agesex weights for wages, was
then calculated for each year since 1948 and used to adjust the official
measure of productivity growth in the private non-farm business sector
to remove the effect of the changing demographic structure of the labor
force. The adjustment made little difference in general.
Next, a constrained-mean time-series model was fitted to the ad-
justed productivity growth series. As with fertility, the time-series
model provides information about the variance, autocovariance, and
cross-covariance of the series, but not about the long-run mean, which
is imposed. An autoregressive model of order one was found to fit the
data best:
g -= /3:g-1 - aLtg) + 8gt, (A.5)
where /3 is estimated at 0.1640 with a standard error of 0.1408. The
standard deviation of 8g,t is 0.0178. (The model was run on data in
whole units rather than percentage points.) For general budget fore-
casts, including social security and other individual programs, before
estimating the AR(1) we constrain the long-run mean gtO the historical
post-W.W. II (arithmetic) average labor productivity growth rate, 2.3
percent. This is nearly 1 percent per year higher than the SSA assump-
tion on labor productivity growth, but a bit below recent Congressional
Budget Office assumptions. For some runs in which we are looking
solely at social security, and wish to contrast the stochastic forecasts
with deterministic ones, we constrain productivity growth to match that
assumed by the Social Security Actuaries. Note that the rate of growth
of covered wages in the social security system, which is a central compo-
nent of the Actuaries' projections, is less rapid than labor productivity
growth, since the former is affected by changing hours of work and by
the changing share of total compensation that takes the form of untaxed
benefits. We assume the wedge is 0.3 percentage point.
A.2.2 Interest RatesThe bonds held in the Social Security Trust Fund
are a special Treasury issue with a rate of return equal to an averageof
rates on longer term Treasury bonds. We use this special issue rate,
minus the rate of inflation as measured by the CPI-U, as our baseline
real interest rate. All balances in government trust funds and govern-
ment debt held by the public earn interest at either this rate or a
moving average of it, the latter of which is intended to capture the
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Trust Fund. To project the real interest rate, we fit a VAR of order three
that recognizes the conjoined behavior of bond returns (re) and real
stock returns (se):
r = a1r_1 + a2r_2 + a3rt*_3 + Yi-i + Y2-2 + y3s3+ 8r,t'(A.6)
where asterisks denote detrended variables. (The analogous equation for
stock returns in the VAR is not shown.) Point estimates of the a's and '/s
are, in order, 1.1785, 0.8029, 0.4826, 0.0065, 0.0232, and 0.0052. The
standard deviation of e,is 0.0204. As with fertility and productivity
growth, we constrain the long-run means of both series. Real stockre-
turns are assumed to average 7.0 percent, while the long-run real interest
rate is assumed to be 3.0 percent, mirroring the SSA assumption.
A.2.3 Economic Projections We begin witha stochastic sample path
for population. From a recent March CPS, we calculate age-specificaver-
age labor earnings over all people in an age group (sometimes also by
sex). We adjust this age profile multiplicatively so that in conjunction
with the initial population age distribution, it implies aggregate labor
earnings equal to a control total from the National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPAs). Then a stochastic sample path for adjusted productiv-
ity growth is generated. For each forecast year, this sample path is used
to shift the ageearnings profile multiplicatively. Together with the
population sample path, this results in an implied aggregate level of
labor earnings for each forecast year. If needed,a GDP forecast is also
generated by assuming that labor earnings are a constant share of GDP,
as is implied by the behavior of an economy with CobbDouglas produc-
tion that is in a steady state.
A.3 Fiscal Impact Projections
A.3.1 Age ProfilesCross-sectional age profiles of per capita benefit
costs (per member of the population, not just recipients) are estimated for
the base period, using March CPS data for some programs, using adminis-
trative data for some others such as social security and Medicare, and
sometimes combining data from surveys and administrative records. All
profiles are adjusted to yield totals consistent with aggregate control totals
when multiplied by the base-period population age distribution.
A.3.2 Social Security BenefitsFor these, a cross-sectional profile is not
appropriate, because each generation's benefits are pegged toa propor-
tion of its earnings level just before it retires, and the real benefit level is
not subject to economic uncertainty thereafter. However, a generation's178Lee & Edwards
benefits do vary on a per capita basis as it ages, due to selectivemortal-
ity, to changing proportions of widow(er)s andmarried couples, and to
the continuing labor supply of some members combinedwith greater
deferred benefits. We estimate this age-specific benefit profile forthe
older ages, and peg its initial value based on the stochasticproductivity
level just prior to retirement for each generation.
A.3.3 Health CostsThe basic strategy was described in the text. Per
enrollee health costs for each closeness-to-death category areprojected
according to a time-series model fitted to the gap between thegrowth rate
of health cost data and productivity growth, with the mean gap con-
strained in future years to match the CBO projection assumptions,which
are also similar to the recentlyrevised HCFA/CMIMS assumptions. CBO
and HCFA/CMMS assume that the gap will continue indefinitely,but that
it will decline to about 1 percent in a few decades (Leeand Miller, 2001).
A.4 Budget Projections
A.4.1 General StrategyFollowing CBO, we assume that most benefit
age schedules rise withproductivity growth; social security and health
programs are exceptions, as discussed above.Each sample path wifi have
different benefit cost profiles, due to stochastic productivitygrowth. The
age profiles are then multiplied bythe stochastic population forecasts to
generate stochastic program cost estimates. Tax payments canbe calcu-
lated using tax payment age profiles for various kinds of taxes,estimated
cross-sectionally from a recent March CPS, and adjusted to matchthe
NIPA control totals, or inferred from payroll tax rules and earnings.Taxes
on capital are assumed to grow withGDP, since rents are assumed to be a
constant share of income in the steady state. Trustfunds are projected
along sample paths using accounting identities andthe stochastic
interest-rate projections. Likewise, debt can be projected usingaccount-
ing identities and a moving average of the same real interest rate.In such
runs, Trust Fund balances and debtlevels will be among the outputs. In
some other runs, tax rates are setendogenously to comply with stipu-
lated assumptions about limits on debt-to-GDP ratios, or onthe Social
Security Trust Fund ratio to costs. It is also possible toadjust benefit
levels in addition to, or instead of, tax rates, to meet suchimposed budget
balance constraints.
A.4.2 Age-Neutral Budget Components Some important partsof the
budget are not age-targeted. These include public goods, mainly expen-
ditures on defense and research. We follow CBO in projectingthese as aThe Fiscal Effects of Population Aging in the U. S179
constant share of GDP. They also include private goods or quasi-public
goods, such as expenditures for roads, sewers, police, fire, andso on.
These are also assumed to be a fixed proportion of GDP, and therefore
grow stochastically with population and productivity growth. Finally,
there is national debt. The balance of flows into and out of national debt
is determined endogenously by the budget balance eachyear.
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